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Abstract: Data driven businesses, services, and even smart cities of tomorrow depend on access 
to data not only from machines, but also personal data of consumers, clients, citizens. Sustain-
able utilization of such data must base on legal compliancy, ethical soundness, and consent. 
Data subjects nowadays largely lack empowerment over utilization and monetization of their 
personal data. To change this, we propose a tokenized ecosystem of personal data (TokPD), 
combining anonymization, referencing, encryption, decentralization, and functional layering to 
establish a privacy preserving solution for processing of personal data. This tokenized ecosys-
tem is a more generalized variant of the smart city ecosystem described in the preceding publi-
cation "Smart Cities of Self-Determined Data Subjects" (Frecè & Selzam 2017) with focus to-
wards further options of decentralization. We use the example of a smart city to demonstrate, 
how TokPD ensures the data subjects’ privacy, grants the smart city access to a high number of 
new data sources, and simultaneously handles the user-consent to ensure compliance with mod-
ern data protection regulation. 
Keywords: Decentralized Data Storage, Data Self-Determination, Zero-Knowledge, Distributed 
Ledger Technology, Tokenization 
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1. Introduction 
Data has been termed to be the „oil of the 21st century“ (Palmer, 2006). While the comparison 
might be misleading in certain aspects, one can say with certainty that data will be the fuel smart 
cities run on. To collect larger volumes and a broad variety of this “city fuel”, data sources from 
the public but increasingly also the private sphere play a huge role. Personal data becomes 
increasingly important through the exploding number of IoT devices in private households and 
private vehicles, the ever-present and diverse collection of mobile devices, and increasingly also 
connected, automated, and smart homes in general. Data collected that way can be used to 
improve the efficiency of a city or offer valuable services to its citizens (Batty, 2013). However, 
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regulations concerning privacy and personal data complicate the acquisition and analysis of 
personal data and will do more so in the future, as the privacy of citizens’ personal data has 
become a hot topic over the last decade. As the prestigious international law firm Covington & 
Burling put it: “If big data is the new oil, then privacy is the new green.” (Harris, 2014). 
The new European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) dictates that data belongs to the 
data subject and must only be used in accordance with the data subject, even if the data has been 
created by a third-party (European Parliament, 2016). This fundamentally changes the perspective 
on data for any organization, person, or service processing personal data. It also changes today’s 
and tomorrow’s perspectives on the personal data pools of smart buildings, smart neighborhoods, 
and smart cities. Even more so as under the new GDPR any data with a relation to an individual is 
considered personal data, e.g. data concerning electricity usage and production, water, waste wa-
ter, traffic movement, consumer habits, communication habits, utilization of buildings, etc. Smart 
cities can very well make use of such data, e.g. concerning people’s driving behavior, electricity 
usage, air quality, day-to-day-routine, commuting pattern, water usage, heating conduct, shopping 
habits, recreational activities, etc. (Nuaimi, Neyadi, Mohamed, & Al-jaroodi, 2015). Up until now, 
data consumers could get user related data from wherever possible, combining it with data from 
countless other sources, analyzing it, as well as passing on the data or analytical results of it to 
third parties. Processing this kind of data without the data subject’s explicit consent will be illegal 
after 25 May 2018, once the GDPR is in full effect. That and complementary regulations thus also 
affect smart cities, which will among other requirements have to deal with the data subjects’ right 
for data rectification, to limit data processing, for portability of their data, for data erasure (right to 
be forgotten) and more. 
Many data consumers are uncertain about how to react to the new regulation to ensure the legal 
compliance of their data processing. Uncertainty to this degree resulting in fear of a misstep can be 
paralyzing for any project relying on private and/or personal data. The approach being discussed 
in this paper aims to ease this uncertainty and reassure profit and non-profit data acquisition alike 
by offering access to relevant data in an easy, quick, secure and – above all – legal way. We pro-
pose an approach aiming at a tokenized (and decentralized – cf. section 2) ecosystem of personal 
data (TokPD) that reassures data consumers (such as cities offering data-based services) and data 
subjects (such as citizens, companies, organizations etc.) alike, and offers both sides an opportunity 
to take part in advancing data-based services, in a save, fair and legally compliant way.  
For some data subjects it might seem an attractive perspective to outsource the processing of 
their personal data to commercial providers, who then take over the responsibility for mainte-
nance, safe keeping, and – potentially – commercial exploitation through data consumers, thereby 
granting such third-party data consumers access to the data. Yet, as any commercial entity provid-
ing a service for personal data management is potentially under financial pressure to manage their 
customers’ data for its own good instead of their customers’ (Mortimer, 2011), we think this to be 
in breach of the GDPR’s spirit of digital self-determination of the data subjects. The data and busi-
JeDEM 9(2): 110-133, 2017 Jan T. Frecè, Thomas Selzam 
112 CC: Creative Commons License, 2017. 
ness models being used in organizations like e.g. Midata1 , Trusthub2 , or myData3  do not elimi-
nate the need for data subjects to blindly trust whoever is managing their data and hope for their 
integrity, not to mention the additional security risks in case of a breach. In centralized setups such 
as these, a security breach has a stronger impact, as all data is concentrated in one location ready 
for pick-up. An attack on a centralized host of personal data is also more probable, since attacking 
one target hosting huge quantities of personal data is vastly more attractive than attacking hun-
dreds or thousands of different targets hosting only a very limited amount of data each. 
1) Only encrypted data leaves the data layer. This protects sensitive, personal data outside of 
its place of creation or intended storage from (malicious) observers, both during transport 
and storage. 
2) Only data stripped off any personal identifiers leaves the data layer. This protects the da-
ta owner’s identity, even in case of a data breach in the TokPD system, and even if all layers 
of encryption should become permeable. 
3) Data stored outside the data layer must not lead to the revealing of data. This must hold 
true even if the encryption can be undone in the future, due to progresses in crypto break-
ing and hardware improvements. 
4) Neither the assembly layer nor the analysis layer has access to any unencrypted data, or 
unencrypted analysis results. Such results are encrypted, with access cryptologically only 
possible for the consumer layer. 
In section 2, the components of the TokPD approach are defined. Subsequently in section 3, 
those components are put into action by discussing their processes and their co-operation therein. 
Section 4 discusses the three requirements listed above and explains their conceptual fulfillment 
within the approach. In section 5 we further discuss potential areas of application outside of a 
smart city context. 
This paper builds on the insights had in the preceding publication (Frecè & Selzam 2017). How-
ever, it goes beyond the application in the smart city context and describes an ecosystem built on 
the use of tokens instead of data. It also examines further steps of decentralization striving for the 
ultimate and distant goal of creating a truly intermediary-free system. 
2. Architecture Overview 
The methodology discussed in this paper consists of several roles and elements coordinated in 
such a way as to ensure a zero-knowledge approach and minimal exposure even in the case of 
failing cyphers or key lengths in the future. 
The following section gives an overview of the integral parts of the TokPD approach and their 
functionality. The interaction and co-operation of these roles and elements are topic of section 3. 
                                                     
1 https://www.midata.coop/ 
2 https://trust-hub.com/ 
3 https://mydatafi.wordpress.com/ 
JeDEM 9(2): 110-133, 2017 Jan T. Frecè, Thomas Selzam 
113 CC: Creative Commons License, 2017. 
2.1. Roles 
In this paper, the term “role” is reserved for agents interacting with the TokPD system, while 
technical components of the system itself are considered “elements”. There are four roles involved 
in TokPD: 
Data subjects contribute to the creation of data related to themselves through interaction with 
data creators. Data subjects are often natural persons, but legal persons are also conceivable. A 
data subject’s private data must be stored in a distributed data store that is equipped with a local 
TokPD node, in order to be manageable by the TokPD system. Data subjects are certainly welcome 
to set up, secure, run, and maintain such distributed data stores themselves. However, the more 
likely case is that most data creators will assume the responsibility of data storages for their re-
spective data subjects. 
Data creators are individuals, organization, or devices that create private data related to data 
subjects. They act under the authority of the respective data subject. The data creator is obliged to 
store the private data it creates in its own data store, or any data store designated by the data sub-
ject (e.g. if the data subject is running its own distributed data store or would like to store the data 
in a specific distributed data store). 
Data consumers are individuals or organizations using services based on TokPD to have rele-
vant data sets assembled and analyzed. Data consumers initiate their requests for analytics on the 
system’s TokPD platform. They never get in contact with data subjects or data creators. Once the 
analysis request has been processed by the TokPD system and the results are ready, the data con-
sumer collects those in encrypted form at the TokPD platform. Access to raw, unencrypted, or non-
anonymized data is never granted to data consumers; it is in fact prevented through the architec-
ture of TokPD. 
Analytics providers offer computational power to data consumers for data analytics. Any anal-
ysis is to be performed on encrypted data sets; hence the analytics provider has to meet certain 
technical requirements to take part in a TokPD solution. Apart from technical restrictions, the data 
consumer is free to choose its preferred analytics provider. As the analytics provider exclusively 
handles encrypted data sets, and returns encrypted results only, it never has access to unencrypted 
data itself. As this setup follows the zero-knowledge approach (Goldreich & Oren, 1994; 
Goldwasser, Micali, & Rackoff, 1989), an organization can be in the role of the data consumer and 
the analytics provider at the same time, without compromising the data subjects’ security or priva-
cy. However, such an approach is not recommended, as it heavily depends on long-term protec-
tion by encryption. If, in such a situation, the encryption algorithm used to encrypt the analytic 
payload sent to the analytics provider fails sometime in the near or far future or the CPUs become 
fast enough to brute force it, the data consumer can use the data sent to the analytics provider to 
gain additional, though still anonymized knowledge. Therefore, it is not recommended to combine 
the roles of data consumer and analytics provider, though technically possible. 
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2.2. Elements 
In addition to roles, the following elements form the technological part of a TokPD-based setup. It 
consists of physical hardware like servers and nodes, but also of software and protocols like smart 
contracts or the distributed ledger. The term “distributed ledger technology” (DLT) will be used 
throughout this paper to designate any type of distributed ledger supporting smart contracts. 
Nowadays such a system would probably be based on a blockchain. The architecture of TokPD 
does however not specifically rely on blockchain characteristics and is therefore compatible with 
other DLT implementations. 
The TokPD platform is the heart or rather the coordinator of the TokPD solution. It manages all 
accounts for data consumers and data subjects, provides access management functionalities for 
them, and maintains an interface through which the data analysis requests of data consumers are 
initiated, processed, and delivered. 
The platform analyses incoming requests for data analytics and collects the required analysis 
algorithms from the data consumer. It assembles encrypted data sets coming from the nodes, and 
forwards the data set together with the analytics algorithm to the analytics provider. After the 
analysis, it stores the encrypted analysis results and allows the rightful data consumer to collect 
those. The platform also serves as a validator node for the distributed ledger. Following the zero-
knowledge approach, the TokPD platform has no access to any unencrypted personal data, and 
has no knowledge concerning the location of data sets. 
Being the only centralized element of a TokPD system, the TokPD platform’s exposure to at-
tacks is naturally higher (cf. section 7 for a discussion regarding the potential of decentralization of 
TokPD). Therefore, the TokPD platform does not have access to any unencrypted information con-
cerning data subjects, information pulled from decentralized data stores or analysis results. It 
merely coordinates the collaboration of all TokPD elements and offers a service platform for data 
consumers and data subjects. Therefore, and due to the compartmentalized architecture, the only 
data accessible on the TokPD platform in case of a successful attack and total breach is information 
concerning past analysis requests by data consumers and the reference metadata of data subjects’ 
data sets (cf. section 4.1.4). 
For example, instead of learning all the results of hourly conducted and saved air quality meas-
urements at a data subject’s house, an attacker of a TokPD platform would, even after a total 
breakdown of the platform, including its encryption, only learn, that the same data subject saved 
hourly measurements of air quality somewhere in a distributed data store connected to a TokPD 
node. By default, an attacker would even not be able to find out how many data sets are assigned 
to the data subject (for detail cf. section 3.1). The identity of the data subject, the location of the 
TokPD node, the data of the air quality measurements, all remain unknown to any attacker. The 
only way to get these is through compromising the data subject’s login credentials, not by com-
promising the TokPD platform. 
The local TokPD nodes are active on the distributed ledger, validating transmissions which 
have been created by the TokPD platform or other nodes, as well as adding blocks to the distribut-
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ed ledger to reference data. Nodes create encrypted references to private data residing in distribut-
ed data stores. Those encrypted references are then added to the distributed ledger by the nodes. 
Local TokPD nodes handle the requests for data sets coming from the TokPD platform and aggre-
gate the private data from the data stores into according and encrypted data sets. To preserve pri-
vacy conditions, all person-related data fields, or identifying data, are excluded by the distributed 
data store before assembling the data set that then reaches the local TokPD node. 
Distributed data stores contain the private data created by data creators. Distributed data 
stores are usually controlled by data creators; however, a distributed data store controlled by one 
or several data subjects taking the role of their data creators’ distributed data store is not uncon-
ceivable. Both implementations are supported by TokPD. In either case, the distributed data store 
lies outside of the TokPD system and is not administrated by it. Hence, the main requirement for 
distributed data stores is their ability to send anonymized data sets to the local nodes upon re-
quest. 
Blockchain technology (Nakamoto, 2008) is used by the TokPD approach as one potential im-
plementation of distributed ledger technology (DLT) capable of immutably storing data and de-
centrally executing smart contracts. The distributed ledger does not contain personal data of any 
data subjects, but merely encrypted references to it. It connects all local TokPD nodes and the 
TokPD platform. All nodes and the TokPD platform are functioning as validators, ensuring that 
every addition to the distributed ledger is compliant and every execution of a smart contract is 
done properly. Distributed ledger technology allows for pseudonymity for system users, yet 
transparency and traceability of transactions, while giving no single stakeholder control over the 
data channel. These features make blockchain currently the DLT protocol of choice allowing for 
self-determination for data subjects in combination with encryption and consequent referencing of 
data. The TokPD concept, however, is technologically neutral and therefore compatible with other 
distributed ledger technologies and does not explicitly rely on blockchain. 
Tokenization in TokPD is achieved through publishing referencing metadata exclusively. A da-
ta subject's private or personal data is valuable and must therefore be protected, yet also be made 
accessible and utilizable under specific conditions. TokPD separates data and data operation by 
having tokens in the blockchain (or other distributed ledger) represent the data, the data type, and 
the data location, while the data subject's personal, private data itself remains outside the token. 
As the TokPD distributed data stores are addressed through cryptographic keys (cf. section 3.1. for 
details on data announcement), the token contains all the information needed to address the dis-
tributed data store without containing the actual location or identity of it. The latter two thus be-
come irrelevant, meaning that data can even be transferred from one distributed data store to an-
other, as long as its encryption key is transferred too. As a result, the first step towards an infor-
mation-centric network has been made: data accessibility has become independent from data loca-
tion or means of storage. As soon as the data subject decides to create a token for her or his data by 
defining the sharing conditions for it, the data referenced in this token can be accessed no matter 
where the distributed data store is currently located and how it would have to be addressed. 
Smart contracts are executable applications stored in a distributed ledger (Buterin, 2014). In 
TokPD they have two functions: 
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1) Access conditions to personal data are defined by the data subjects themselves and stored 
within the distributed ledger as smart contracts. These smart contracts function as gate-
keepers, providing partially automated access management to personal data. To further 
strengthen the data subjects’ privacy, the access conditions of all new data are initially set 
so that no external access to the data is allowed. To grant third parties analytical access to 
its data, the data subjects must actively define access conditions for their data. Without any 
definition of these explicit access conditions, subjects’ data remains unreachable from the 
TokPD system. 
2) If access is granted, the smart contract signals the responsible node to export the requested 
data, compile it as an encrypted data set, and send that to the TokPD platform. As the ref-
erence to the node is encrypted, smart contracts do not have access to sufficient information 
to conclude which node they are contacting or even if they have contacted the node for an-
other data set ever before. Smart contracts are executed on all nodes of the distributed ledg-
er quasi-simultaneously, in order to compare the results and thereby expose manipulation 
attempts by individual nodes. For each announced data set, there is a separate smart con-
tract residing in the distributed ledger, acting as a gatekeeper to the data set. Each time the 
access conditions for the data set are amended, the respective smart contract, responsible 
for access control to the data set, must be re-added to the distributed ledger. Thus, only the 
newest version of a smart contract is considered valid. 
3. Process 
The TokPD concept consists of three main processes covering the system’s functions: 
• Data Creation and Announcement 
• Data Access Management 
• Data Analysis Report 
In the following sections, the process steps and goals are discussed in detail and are later used 
in section 4 in combination with the roles and elements to illustrate the fulfillment of the require-
ments discussed in section 1. For a better understanding, the example of a data subject and its mo-
bility data is used throughout the sections. 
3.1. Data Creation and Announcement 
The “Data Creation and Announcement” process (cf. Figure 1) is for the most part the first-running 
process as it represents the originating point of any data set managed in a TokPD system. The 
process involves the following functionalities and roles: 
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Table 1: Data Creation and Announcement - Roles and Functionalities (source: author) 
Functionalities Involved roles and elements 
Create data in distributed data store Data Creator (outside TokPD) 
Announce data to the TokPD system Data Creator / Data Subject 
Example: Citizens track their movements across the city by public transports, by car, by bike, 
and on foot using all sorts of devices. Additionally, city car plate readers, cell phone antennas, and 
city cameras with face recognition have additional information concerning somebody’s wherea-
bouts across a possibly extended period of time. Some citizens are willing to donate this data to the 
city to improve its traffic models, others consider this information too delicate to share at all, and 
yet others are willing to grant access to their data to commercial data consumers for a fee. The de-
vice tracking the data subject’s movement thereby acts as a data creator in the data creation and 
announcement process. 
1) In order to have the newly created mobility data announced to the TokPD system and have 
it mapped to the respective data subject for access management, the data subject has to 
grant the data creator permission (via mobile app or web app) to announce the new data 
set. 
2) As soon as the permission has been granted, the data creator announces the data to the lo-
cal TokPD node. By default, a new Wallet-ID is generated for each new data set (cf. section 
4.1.3) by the TokPD platform, preventing attackers from recognizing whether one data set 
has the same owner as another one, just by looking at the encrypted Wallet-IDs in the dis-
tributed ledger. Alternatively, the data subject may also decide to use an already existing 
Wallet-ID to group data sets together for individual data overview reasons. 
3) The local TokPD node creates separate encrypted references in the distributed ledger refer-
ring to the different distributed data stores the mobility data is located: at the data subject’s 
home data repository (self-tracked mobility data), at the telecommunication company’s da-
ta center (cell phone based mobility data), and in the data repository of the city security 
services (face recognition based mobility data).  
The only unencrypted part of the reference is the so-called Type-ID (cf. section 4.1.3), des-
ignating the type of the referenced data. In the mobility data example, the Type-ID would 
disclose that the referenced data is mobility data. For more detailed information concerning 
this step, please refer to chapter B below. 
As soon as the new entries have been validated on the distributed ledger, they can be used by data 
consumers such as the city’s planning office to refer to data without having any knowledge 
regarding the data’s owner or its location. By default, however all access to freshly announced data 
is denied. Consequently, the data subject has to modify the access conditions of a data set in order 
to make it potentially available for analytic requests by a data consumer. 
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Figure 1: Data Creation and Announcement Overview (source: author) 
 
3.2. Data Announcement: Key Utilization and Smart Contract Generation 
Steps 2 and 3 of the previously discussed process mention the generation of a smart contract, 
containing information concerning the data announced. For a better understanding of the detailed 
steps resulting in a smart contract (cf. Figure 2), containing an encrypted WalletID, an unencrypted 
TypeID, as well as an encrypted DataID are described in detail below: 
1) The data subject creates a new wallet and thereby a new WalletID using the TokPD plat-
form. While data can be added to existing WalletIDs, it is strongly recommended to use 
separate WalletIDs for enhanced protection. 
2) A user-dependent symmetric key, created at user registration, is used by the platform to 
encrypt the WalletID, after having padded it with random data. 
3) The encrypted WalletID is presented to the data subject. Only when the data subject de-
cides to share this WalletID with a distributed data store, the announcement begins. 
4) The distributed data store adds the unencrypted TypeID of the data to be announced, as 
well as the encrypted WalletID to the smart contract content. 
5) The local DataID of the data to be announced is sent to the local TokPD node. 
6) The local TokPD node initiates the encryption of the DataID provided. 
7) A node-dependent symmetric key is used by the local TokPD node to encrypt the local Da-
taID, before adding it to the smart contract content. 
8) The local TokPD node has all the information it needs to create a new smart contract on the 
distributed ledger, thereby announcing the data’s existence and type 
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Figure 2: Data Announcement: Key Utilization and Smart Contract Generation (source: author) 
3.3. Data Access Management 
The “Data Access Management” process can be performed upon existing, announced data sets and 
is exclusively triggered by the data subject. Goal of this process is an adjustment of a data set’s 
access conditions according to the latest wishes of the data subject. 
Table 2: Data Access Management - Roles and Functionalities (source: author) 
Functionalities Involved roles and elements 
Adjust access conditions Data Subject 
Example: After having decided to provide its mobility data to the city, a data subject logs into 
the TokPD platform. There all the data sets describing the recorded movements through the city 
are listed. Upon being announced, the data set has been given default access conditions, prohibit-
ing any third-party access to it. If the data subject wants to grant access to this data for analyses, it 
must amend the respective access conditions. 
Access conditions can be formulated using all types of conditions and combinations of condi-
tions that are verifiable by smart contracts. This may e.g. include temporal or geographical re-
strictions, financial compensation, restrictions bound to the total number of data sets exhibiting the 
same Type-ID, a counter only allowing a certain number of accesses, etc. If all defined access con-
ditions for a data set are found to be met by a smart contract while processing a search request, the 
data set is considered relevant for the search and is consequently included to it. In this example, 
the data subject could grant access to all movements from Monday to Friday between 10 am and 4 
pm older than three months in a maximal resolution of an hourly average. 
3.4. Data Analysis Request 
The “Data Analysis Request” process (cf. Figure 3) is triggered by a data consumer in need of an 
analysis of data sets fitting a certain profile. Goal of the process is not the collection of these data 
sets but rather the reception of an encrypted result answering the analysis question. The process is 
performed upon all existing and announced data sets fitting the provided profile. 
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Table 3: Data Analysis Request: Roles and Functionalities (source: author) 
Functionalities Involved roles and elements 
Create and submit analysis requests Data Consumer 
Check permissions and get relevant 
anonymized data 
TokPD platform, smart contracts, 
local TokPD nodes, distributed data 
stores 
Perform analysis and return result TokPD platform, analytics pro-
vider 
Example: A city project (data consumer) has the task to plan new public transport lines, and 
improve the occupancy of the existing ones. Having complete mobility data for a large number of 
citizens (data subjects) over months makes such a challenge much easier to tackle. In this example, 
the data consumer is looking for the points of the highest concentration of people trying to move 
through the city and their respective destinations in time slices of 15 minutes. This is the back-
ground the data consumer starts the data analysis request process against: 
1) The data consumer logs in the TokPD platform and creates a new analysis request contain-
ing the analysis attributes needed and provides the respective analytics algorithm. In this 
case the geographic position in a 15-minute interval would be enough to determine choke 
points. The destination can be assumed by tracking each subject to where it comes to a 
longer halt. 
2) The TokPD platform uses the Type-IDs of all referenced data sets to isolate the data sets fit-
ting the data consumer’s request; in this case mobility data. The TokPD platform then sends 
the analysis request to the smart contracts protecting the data sets fitting the analysis pro-
file from unauthorized access. 
3) Only if all access conditions defined in a smart contract are met, a data request is sent by 
the smart contract to the local node harboring the relevant data set. These nodes are ad-
dressed via an encrypted address pool, allowing only the recipient node to decrypt the cor-
rect address. For the access conditions described as an example in section 3.2 no data re-
quest would be sent out, as the condition of maximal one average data set per hour is not 
fulfilled. 
4) When the affected local nodes receive the data request, they in turn request the relevant da-
ta set(s) from the local database. Only the relevant information, in this case the data sub-
ject’s location in a 15-minute interval, is exported. 
5) The local node encrypts the anonymized data set fully homomorphically and transfers it 
back to the TokPD platform.  
6) The TokPD platform assembles the encrypted data sets relevant for the analysis request 
and finally sends the integrated and encrypted analytics payload to the data analytics pro-
vider. 
7) The analytics provider receives the analytics payload and executes the algorithm, which 
has been provided by the data consumer in step 1 and is now forwarded by the TokPD 
platform, upon it. The computations can be done using either homomorphic computation 
(Goldwasser, Kalai, Popa, Vaikuntanathan, & Zeldovich, 2013) or secure multi-party com-
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putation (Zyskind, Nathan, & Pentland, 2015). The equally encrypted result of the analysis 
is then returned to the TokPD platform. During this process the analytics provider does not 
gain any knowledge concerning the data being processed, apart from the amount of data 
sent for analysis. While this allows for speculations regarding the number of data sets in the 
respective analysis, conclusive numbers can only be calculated if the structure of a single 
data set and its size are known. This is prevented by the data sets’ encryption. 
8) When the encrypted result is sent back to the TokPD platform by the analytics provider, the 
data consumer is informed. He can then log in to the TokPD platform and download, de-
crypt, and thereby finally access the result of the ordered analysis. 
 Figure 3: Data Analysis Request (source: author) 
Privacy and security in all processes, but especially in the data analysis request process, depend 
on strict role separation and seamless encryption. On the one hand this is achieved by using cur-
rent ciphers and key lengths. On the other hand, it also heavily relies on key management and spe-
cialized types of encryption, as the next section emphasizes. 
4. Fulfilling Privacy 
In order to effectively protect the data subjects’ privacy, a TokPD system has to meet the three 
requirements listed in the introduction section. The next sections demonstrate how two layers of 
anonymization and different types of encryption are applied in this concept in order to do so. 
4.1. Anonymization 
Anonymization has been the main tool against data abuse for decades. It is the first layer of 
protection against privacy violation and data abuse in the TokPD approach and is divided into two 
categories: data anonymization, addressing personal information in data sets, and system 
anonymization, focusing on filtering out any system-related information not inevitably necessary 
for a successful transmission. 
4.1.1. System Anonymization 
The address or other meta-data of an analysis request can reveal much to an attacker concerning 
the TokPD system itself and possible points of attack; even if the data itself remains inaccessible. In 
order to minimize the information exposed this way several safeguards are applied within TokPD. 
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4.1.1.1. Smart Contracts as Gate Keepers 
In step 2 of the Data Analysis Request process, analysis requests are not sent directly from the 
TokPD platform to the decentralized nodes to check for relevant data, as this would reveal the 
decentralized nodes linked to data sets relevant for this analysis request. Additionally, such a 
proceeding would leak information concerning the total number of data sets fitting the Type-ID 
and their location. 
Instead the request is sent to smart contracts saved in the decentralized ledger acting as gate-
keepers keeping the identities of individual decentralized data stores unknown. By keeping this 
information from the TokPD platform, its exposure is heavily reduced, as the TokPD platform is 
the most visible part of a TokPD system and therefore the most threatened one. To counteract this 
exposure, the TokPD platform only works with unencrypted, accessible information (Type-IDs) to 
sort out the potentially relevant data sets. Furthermore, it does not directly interact with the decen-
tralized nodes but solely communicates with smart contracts in the distributed ledger instead. This 
allows for the TokPD platform to lack knowledge concerning which data set is de facto relevant for 
the analysis and where the data is located, and nevertheless still be perfectly functional. 
4.1.1.2. Decentralized Nodes Remain Hidden 
To prevent illicit data drain, smart contracts only accept analysis requests signed by the TokPD 
platform. To prevent an identification of individual decentralized nodes, the Location-IDs are 
padded with random data and encrypted during their creation. This results in unique Location-IDs 
for each data set, only recognizable to the decentralized node administrating the related data set. 
When contacting the decentralized node, the smart contracts use the Location-ID as an address 
and broadcast the analysis request to all decentralized nodes. This setup allows the smart contracts 
to contact the correct node without having any information about it, apart from a padded and 
encrypted Location-ID. 
4.1.1.3. Decentralized Data Stores Respond to their Nodes Only 
Since the decentralized data store is where personal data is stored, it consequently represents the 
final target for any attacker. Therefore, the decentralized data stores are confined to 
communicating with their local, decentralized TokPD nodes only. They only accept requests 
signed by a known and authorized node and even the accepted requests are matched against a 
personal data blacklist: Data fields (attributes) included in this blacklist are not available for any 
kind of TokPD requests and are therefore never sent out towards the decentralized node or any 
other part of TokPD, even if it had been explicitly requested as a consequence of a successful 
attack. 
4.1.1.4. TokPD Platform has Minimal Knowledge 
The TokPD platform as the essential part in the middle of the TokPD system handles all incoming 
and outgoing requests and is therefore a high priority target for any attacker of a TokPD system. 
To mitigate this exposure, the TokPD platform is never handling unencrypted data or data 
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encrypted with a key available to the TokPD platform. Consequently, while the TokPD platform is 
coordinating the process from the incoming analysis request to the outgoing analysis result and 
therefore knows which step has to be triggered next, it has no knowledge of the TokPD nodes 
addressed or the results returned by them or the analysis provider. Therefore, any attacker 
controlling the TokPD platform would not gain any knowledge concerning personal data. 
4.1.2. Data Anonymization 
When a request for data arrives at the local TokPD node, the node requests the needed data from 
the local database. However, identity revealing data such as name, address, phone numbers, social 
number, physical features, religion, etc. will never be delivered by the distributed data store, even 
if the original request illicitly demands for it. 
The risk of re-identification of individual data subjects generally depends on how much and 
what kind of auxiliary data an attacker can use to interrelate with the data to be re-identified. With 
rapidly growing volumes of publicly available data of increasing variety, the amount and quality 
of data that can be used to interrelate with data to be re-identified has reached a tipping-point 
where anonymity cannot be established anymore simply by omitting certain data fields 
(Narayanan, Huey, & Felten, 2016). While methods like k-anonymity or l-diversity are still used for 
anonymization under certain conditions, it is only a matter of time before they will become broad-
ly useless as well (Muntés-Mulero & Nin, 2009). Years ago, Cavoukian and Castro (2014), strong 
defenders of anonymization approaches, warned that that “[i]n the case of high-dimensional data, 
additional arrangements [beyond de-identification] may need to be pursued” and the US Presi-
dent’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) adds “Anonymization remains 
somewhat useful as an added safeguard, but it is not robust against near-term future re-
identification methods. PCAST does not see it as being a useful basis for policy.” (Graham et al., 
2014). Consequently, anonymization is but the first layer of protection in the TokPD approach, 
fulfilling the second requirement. The remaining two requirements concerning 1) the remaining of 
unencrypted information in the distributed data store and 2) the encryption of analysis results ex-
clusively for the data consumer are handled via different types of encryption. 
4.2. Encryption 
There are two types of encryption at work in the TokPD approach. The encryption of the 
distributed ledger dictates how the data stored indefinitely on the ledger is encrypted. Together 
with the encryption of the communication between the elements of TokPD, it ensures the 
fulfillment of the three remaining requirements after the step of anonymization has been 
performed. 
4.2.1. Encryption of the Distributed Ledger 
Although there is no personal data stored in the distributed ledger, only indices and references, 
this information has to be protected nevertheless. Each entry on the distributed ledger referencing 
a data set consists of three elements only: 
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Type-ID, containing information concerning the type of data referenced. In the example used 
for this paper, the Type-ID would simply indicate mobility data, but it could also contain more 
specifics like having a separate Type-ID for cell phone-based mobility data and for face recogni-
tion-based mobility data. 
Location-ID, containing the encrypted ID of the node holding the referenced data set. As the ID 
is padded with random data before encryption, two data set references referring to the same loca-
tion would still have different encrypted Location-IDs and no relation information is leaked to an 
attacker. 
Wallet-ID, containing the ID of the wallet used to manage this data set. The wallet’s owner is 
automatically the owner of the data set. As each data set can be equipped with a new Wallet-ID, 
even data sets managed by the same data subject can be made to appear absolutely differently and 
no relation information is leaked. 
Apart from Type-IDs, which need to be in clear text as they are used to pre-filter data sets be-
fore sending the analysis request to the smart contracts, all elements are encrypted. The data label 
and the Wallet-ID are encrypted using the TokPD platform symmetric key. This ensures that only 
the TokPD platform is able to decrypt those IDs as it is the only entity in the system with a legiti-
mate need to know how a data creator or a data subject has decided to label a data set or in which 
digital wallet a data subject decided to store this data. All this information is needed to inform the 
data subject and enable him to take on data management himself. 
Figure 4: Communication Encryption(source: author) 
 
The Location-ID on the other hand, is encrypted using the local node symmetric key, as the lo-
cal node is the only entity in the system needing to know whether a data set is stored at its own 
location or not. Note that nodes are only able to identify data references pointing to their own loca-
tion. Locations of other nodes are unreadable to a node. 
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4.2.2. Communication Encryption 
During the communication between data consumer, TokPD platform, local node, and analytics 
provider, five different keys are involved in encryption; each key responsible for a separate part of 
the process (cf. Figure 4). 
The data consumer public key (DCpub) is created by the data consumer and provided to the 
TokPD platform for each new data analysis request. It is used by the TokPD platform in combina-
tion with the request key public key to create the proxy re-encryption key. 
The data consumer private key (DCpvt) is created by the data consumer and kept private. It is 
used to decrypt the analysis results after receiving them from the TokPD platform. 
The request public key (Rpub) is created by the TokPD platform and distributed among the lo-
cal nodes. It is then used by the local nods to encrypt the data being sent to the analytics provider 
for encrypted computing. 
The request private key (Rpvt) is created by the TokPD platform. It is then used in combination 
with the data consumer public key to create the proxy re-encryption key. After the successful crea-
tion of the proxy re-encryption key, the request private key is erased by the TokPD platform. 
The proxy-re-encryption key (PRE) is created combining the data consumer public key and the 
request private key. The resulting proxy key can be used to re-encrypt data encrypted by the re-
quest public key (Rpub) in a way it can be decrypted using the data consumer private key 
(DCpvt). During the proxy re-encryption process the data is not decrypted and therefore not acces-
sible. 
Communication between different components of a TokPD setup is encrypted on a transport 
layer using TLS. Additional encryption is applied to all the data that also needs protection beyond 
the transportation layer. 
5. Areas of Application 
The ability to analyze a broad range of data sets without having access to them can be 
advantageous in many scenarios and in many perspectives: 
5.1. Commercial Data Market 
Data subjects taking part in a consumer market can hardly avoid leaving a data trail behind. The 
intuitive instinct to protect this data by isolating it in an offline data silo does indeed address the 
data and privacy protection issue. However, it does not allow for any additional value being 
created from this data. Some data subject might not perceive this is a problem and keep their data 
locked up in isolation. Others, however, might want their data to create additional value or they 
might be interested in selling access to their data. For both groups, TokPD offers a solution where 
they can easily and in detail manage access to their data, including the ability to provide access to 
their private data, without exposing it. 
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Data creators mostly do not create data for statistical reasons but for quite practical ones. A pre-
scription is made to treat a disease, a bike is sold to replace an old one, or a flight is booked to go 
on vacation. None of these actions have been performed with the main intension to leave a data 
trail behind, but naturally they still do. This data trail potentially holds information valuable to all 
kinds of commercial players but nevertheless in private possession of the data subject. Therefore, 
every data creator must ensure the data’s security and privacy. Isolating the data might solve the 
security and privacy problems; however, this approach would contradict the modern dogma of 
insight through linking and interrelating data. Hence, a system offering the data creator an easy 
option to store the data locally and at the same time facilitating data management directly by the 
data subject itself, solves many of the data creators’ data privacy-related complications. 
Data consumers in a commercial data market have the need for all kind of information relevant 
to a better understanding of their business model validity, their customers, their suppliers, their 
competitors, etc. Until recently, data volume and possibly data quality have been the highest ob-
stacle on the path to new insights. With the newly introduced data protection legislation in Eu-
rope, legally compliant data handling becomes a relevant factor. Therefore, from an entrepreneur’s 
point of view, a service offering answers based on data that is both relevant and exclusively legally 
compliant, definitely holds an attraction. 
5.2. Public Administration 
Data subjects in a public administration context are all persons being administered by the public 
administration, e.g. the citizens of a smart city. The data being created with reference to the data 
subject is only partly created on initiative of the data subject but still entirely related to it. Where 
the “once only principle” has not been implemented yet, data subjects, for privacy reasons, have to 
provide their data again and again to different administrative offices, resulting in several copies of 
one data set, which in turns leads to out-dated data, as soon as just one of these data set copies is 
not synchronously updated. In such a situation, the TokPD approach could be used to implement 
the “once only principle” in a decentralized way. Consequently, a data subject would profit from a 
tool enabling it to provide access to some parts of the data to certain individuals or institutions, 
without unnecessarily exposing the rest. In addition, the effort of updating data, e.g. after a 
relocation, is in such a system confined to the data silo hosting the data, as all other databases pull 
their information therefrom, resulting in a system more efficient for the administration and the 
citizen. 
Data creators in a traditional context of public administration are all employees of a public ad-
ministration that is processing data concerning private data subjects. Nowadays however, count-
less devices monitoring the city and its citizens produce large volumes of data: citizen-related, per-
sonal data. The role of a data creator in a commercial context closely matches the role of a data 
creator in an administration context. The data involved in public administration has the potential 
to be even more delicate or personal than in a commercial environment. The urge to isolate the 
data to protect it is therefore all the more pressing, and a system enabling data creators to easily 
store the data locally and nevertheless make the information available for other parts of the public 
administration in a controlled way, all the more relevant. 
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Data consumers in the public administration context are public services who would have been 
forced to get their data from the data subject directly, after getting permission for it first, and store 
a copy of it, time and again. This, because so far there is no suitable solution to citizens’ data and 
let data consumers of the public administration run their queries upon it. Hence, for data consum-
ers within the public administration a TokPD system means less duplicate data volume, less or 
rather no outdated copies of data, less risk of privacy violations due to manual mistakes, and a 
better protection of citizen data due to less exposure. 
5.3. Non-human Measurements 
Data subjects in a non-human measurement are hard to distinguish from data creators, as there is 
no direct owner of the data. Weather data measured by private citizens for a citizen-science 
project, air quality of a school being monitored by concerned parents, radioactivity data collected 
by environmental activists, all this data describes conditions per se unrelated to individual 
humans, such as air pressure, temperature and humidity, radioactive activity, etc. However, if this 
data has any relation to the individual carrying out the measurement, this individual – the data 
creator – in addition to the previous role becomes a data subject. This in turn means, that 
publishing the data including the known connection to the data subject & creator would reveal 
potentially personal information. Publishing them in a TokPD-system, however, would allow for a 
regular analysis of the data without running the risk of exposing information about the volunteers 
who keep the measurements going in the first place. 
Data consumers for non-human measurements come in as many shapes and forms as the data 
consumers acting in commercial contexts, with the difference that they are not primarily looking 
into individual behavior but mostly measuring non-human phenomena, like the weather in a re-
gion, biodiversity in a certain area or a city’s blooming patterns in hay fever season. The availabil-
ity of such data, however, depends on the risk the data creators are being exposed to. It is therefore 
in the interest of data consumers, to use a TokPD system, as it encourages donation of data by in-
herently preserving the data subjects’ privacy. 
6. Conclusions 
Implementing a TokPD approach for the data management of a smart city could have advantages 
on several levels and for multiple players. The citizens of a smart city with an implemented 
TokPD-based system could decide to support their city’s data pool by providing private sensor 
data e.g. concerning micro-climatic conditions, traffic density, energy and water usage, air quality, 
energy production, etc. without risking over-sharing data by accident. Furthermore, the data 
subjects can be sure that only answers found through their data – and not the data itself – is 
presented to a data consumer. Consequently, they can also trust their data to remain where they 
trusted to store it. 
A smart city with an implemented TokPD-based system can analyze the data shared by its citi-
zens without risking violation of their consent by either accessing the wrong data or accessing it 
with the wrong intended data usage. The city can also use the same TokPD-based system to im-
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plement the “once only principle” in its administration by keeping their citizens’ administrative 
data safe in distributed data stores while having the citizens grant access to the data, if a municipal 
authority has a legitimate need for it. 
Finally, the TokPD system can be used to facilitate access to anonymized, citizen-provided data 
for data consumers besides the city itself. NGOs might be interested in general traffic or environ-
mental data, event organizers might want to collect data in the form of anonymized statistics, or 
groups of private enthusiasts might be interested in data concerning their passion, e.g. city micro-
climates or urban farming potential. 
Acquiring, storing and analyzing data using a TokPD system offers data subjects and data con-
sumers a safe, privacy-respecting, and legal way to turn personal data into fuel for smart cities. 
This is achieved by empowering the data subjects by giving them the option to share their personal 
data without having to fear for their data security and privacy, as they have to nowadays. 
7. Outlook: Towards a Decentralized Platform in an Information-Centric 
Network 
The TokPD approach, as discussed in this paper so far, achieves decentralization of most elements 
and functionalities through tokenization, functional separation, data distribution etc. One 
centralized function however, still remains: the TokPD platform, handling the user management, 
analysis request management, and reporting, is in the current setup unique in the entire network. 
Its actions cannot be validated by any peers in the network but rather have to be trusted in and 
accepted as the basic infrastructure’s correct functioning. This setup has the usual challenges of 
centralized approaches: users need to trust in the system’s integrity, and at the same time the 
platform constitutes a primary goal for crippling cyber-attacks or hack attempts aiming to shut 
down, block off or take over the platform, hoping to scavenge any data or just interrupt the 
service. Due to the setup of the system no personal data that is stored in distributed data stores 
would be exposed, but by taking over the platform, an attacker could still learn information 
concerning the different users of the system, the active data queries, and the wallet-IDs. What thus 
follows is a discussion on the potential, pros and cons of a decentralized TokPD approach. 
7.1. Decentralizing the Approach 
To achieve a decentralized system, the TokPD platform as the main intermediary within the 
system would have to be decentralized, as well. To realize this, the TokPD platform’s 
functionalities must be entirely replaced by decentralized smart contracts, providing the same 
functionality without the vulnerability and inflexibility of a centralized approach. The TokPD 
platform provides four types of services to two kinds of users: data subjects and data consumers. 
The next chapters will point out the challenges that must be addressed to achieve a purely 
information-centric network of TokPD. 
JeDEM 9(2): 110-133, 2017 Jan T. Frecè, Thomas Selzam 
129 CC: Creative Commons License, 2017. 
7.1.1. Decentralized Authentication 
Authentication must be provided for all users. To avoid credentials being stored on countless 
foreign, decentralized devices, authentication can be performed using a private/public key pair 
created by the data subject or data consumer before registering for TokPD: 
1) Before registration, the user’s client creates a key pair consisting of a private and a public 
key. The public key is provided to the (decentralized) TokPD client application during reg-
istration as a unique identifier, e.g. a Secure Identity Number as used by the BitAuth 
(BitAuth Protocol 2015) protocol. The private key never leaves the client device, where it is 
stored in an encrypted file. 
2) During authentication, the decentralized platform sends a sign request to the client. Nor-
mally, such a sign request would be randomly created, but since the creation process has to 
be replicated by all nodes of the network, it has to be set up in a deterministic way, thereby 
lowering the process’s entropy. The client prompts the user for the password to access the 
locally stored and encrypted private key. After getting access to the private key, the client 
signs the sign request and returns it to the platform. The decentralized platform can now 
validate the signature using the public key provided during registration and authenticate 
the user. 
3) As the private key never leaves the client environment and is stored in encrypted form, it 
can be considered a secure credential, as neither the encrypted private key nor the pass-
word used to encrypt the private key are exposed to the public at any point. To this extent, 
the solution even provides two-factor authentication, as the user must A) possess the en-
crypted private key and B) know the password to decrypt it. 
As a decentralized platform, the TokPD platform also must store its authentication data in a de-
centralized way. Since the authentication data stored for the platform is insufficient to perform a 
successful authentication and the key length can be raised to a level where brute-force attacks be-
come practically inefficient, the decentralization of the authentication part of the TokPD platform 
becomes implementable. 
7.1.2. Access & Request Management 
In a centralized setup, a user is presented with a role-dependent view after authentication. For 
data subjects the view consists of all their personal wallets, the data, and the access rights 
organized within those wallets. A data consumer gets an overview of his past and pending data 
requests. In a centralized setup, this information is not stored on the distributed ledger but on the 
centralized platform itself. Consequently, to decentralize the platform, this information would 
have to be decentralized, as well. However, since this information is sensitive and yet, every node 
in the network would have to process it to validate it, this would mean disclosing a user’s data, a 
data consumer’s request information to all involved nodes. Since storage of data and request 
information in a decentralized ledger is hence infeasible, a client-based composition of the 
information constitutes the next best solution. In this approach, the centralized platform is not 
decentralized using smart contracts but its functionalities are moved to the existing clients, 
somewhat taking the approach of a peer-to-peer network. The needed information is directly taken 
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by the clients from the distributed ledger and decrypted locally using the client’s private keys. 
Either the clients act as distributed ledger nodes themselves or use a third-party service to access 
the distributed ledger’s content. Having all the necessary keys and information locally at their 
disposal and access to the distributed ledger, the clients can address this task themselves. 
While the data and request management functionality of the centralized TokPD platform can be 
moved from a centralized platform to the relevant clients, this reconstruction of the system comes 
at a price: All Wallet-IDs and private keys must be exclusively stored with the clients. Should they 
ever get lost, e.g. due to hardware failure and insufficient backups, there is no contingency; the 
information remains unattainable. Furthermore, security measures on private devices tend to be 
lower than those on professionally maintained ones. Storing crucial information on an uncon-
trolled, private device is therefore always an additional, highly variable risk. 
7.1.3. Analysis Request 
One of the critical tasks of the TokPD platform is key management during data analysis requests. 
From a functional point of view, the five keys in use in the context of the TokPD platform are used 
for encryption, decryption and proxy-re-encryption: 
Encryption is exclusively done using the Request Public Key (Rpub), which is created by the 
TokPD platform and then distributed to the nodes to be used for encryption. In a decentralized 
setup, however, the key creation would not take place once, but would be performed by every 
node running the decentralized platform. For all the nodes to create the same key, the initial pa-
rameters for key generation must be the same for all nodes, replacing randomness with determin-
ism as required by decentralized setups. Since keys are created in pairs or at least the private key 
must be known in order to create a fitting public key, all nodes running the decentralized platform 
would not only possess the newly created Request Public Key (Rpub) but also the fitting Request 
Private Key (Rpvt). Although the Request Private Key (Rpvt) is never directly used for decryption 
or encryption, it is used to generate the proxy-re-encryption key (PRE). It can therefore be used to 
decrypt the data packages sent out by the TokPD nodes. It should therefore remain private; a con-
dition a decentralized setup can currently not fulfil. 
For decryption the Data Consumer Private Key (DCpvt) is used. Since this key is created by the 
data consumer and remains with the data consumer during the entire process before being used to 
decrypt the downloaded analysis results, it is not affected by the decision to render the TokPD 
platform decentralized. 
Proxy-re-encryption is performed in order to give the TokPD platform the opportunity to 
change the encryption performed by the nodes to an encryption the data consumer is able to access 
without exposing the data to the TokPD platform during the process. To create a key that is able to 
proxy-re-encrypt data, two keys are required: the Data Consumer Public Key (DCpub) and the 
Request Private Key (Rpvt). Creating the proxy-re-encryption key (PRE) in a decentralized way in 
turn would mean that all nodes participating in the system don’t only get possession of the two 
keys used as an input, but also have knowledge of the resulting proxy-re-encryption key (PRE). 
This would jeopardize the separation of layers strived for in this setup, since all nodes would have 
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enough information to decrypt personal – even if anonymized – data on its way from the TokPD 
nodes to the TokPD platform before proxy-re-encryption. 
7.2. Conclusions 
We have looked into redesigning the setup from an approach where data storage is decentralized 
while process control remains centralized at the TokPD platform, to a fully decentralized setup. In 
conclusion such an approach is presently not implementable. The reason for the currently 
unavoidable security breach is the involvement of encryption, decryption or key creation in a 
decentralized setup. Not all keys used in the TokPD setup must remain secret, but the ones used to 
regulate the system and keep the different layers apart must. However, keeping information 
confidential within a smart contract setup is currently unfeasible or as expressed by Greenspan: 
“[F]or data hidden in smart contracts, all it takes is for someone to modify their blockchain 
software to display the contract’s full state, and all semblance of secrecy is lost.” (Greenspan 2016). 
To overcome this transparency problem, encrypted computation jumps to mind. After all, the 
same technology is also required in the centralized setup discussed before chapter VII in order to 
keep the data layers isolated from each other. In the case of a decentralized setup, however, there 
is a crucial difference to consider. Computations based on fully homomorphic encryption are still 
quite inefficient and consequently very CPU-intensive. Therefore, they are best executed on re-
sourceful hardware like mainframes or their virtualized cousins in cloud computing. Combined 
with the facts that A) in a decentralized setup the CPU-intensive operations would have to be per-
formed not only once but by all the nodes of the network as a consistency check, that B) the virtual 
machines where smart contracts are usually executed are not as efficient as the implementations 
optimized for encrypted computing, and that C) the hardware in place for a distributed ledger 
node is usually considerably less powerful than a mainframe, the approach of implementing en-
crypted computing in smart contracts becomes an endeavor of the future. Without the possibility 
to have data processed in an encrypted form, in a decentralized way, decentralized key creation 
and handling are too transparent to be functional. 
This leaves the question, whether redesigning a centralized control platform, with no access to 
data of its own, towards a more decentralized approach, where authentication as well as data and 
request management is addressed in a decentralized way, while encryption key creation and their 
application remains in a centralized form, has enough practical advantages to be propagated. 
While decentralized solutions generally have a high appeal, as they facilitate the removal of inter-
mediaries, in this case the intermediary remains in the system, albeit with reduced functionality, 
due to authentication as well as data and request management being handled in a decentralized 
way, which thwarts the decentralization effort. Consequently, for the time being, solution design-
ers have to choose between either preserving anonymity of users and data privacy by trusting a 
centralized intermediary handling encryption keys, isolated from any kind of readable data; or 
creating a decentralized solution, where no actor needs to be trusted but where options to use en-
cryption are heavily limited, as all encryption and decryption has to be processed exclusively by 
clients, only using keys available to clients, and only allowed to process data owned by the specific 
client. There is, of course, still the possibility to again make use of encrypted computing to have 
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clients process (e.g. merge) data owned by other clients, but in view of the high CPU-inefficiency 
and the high variability of connected clients, the performance of such a setup would be volatile, at 
best. 
Considering all the aspects of chapter VII, there are still research gaps to address and close, be-
fore data storage, access and request management, as well as authentication and data analysis can 
be combined into one, decentralized solution. Our discussion demonstrates once more, that dis-
tributed ledger technologies (blockchain etc.) offer great opportunities for tokenization and decen-
tralization of ecosystems, while still facing challenges overcoming the intermediary logic, at least 
in contexts with greater complexity than value exchanges such as financial transactions. 
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